Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger: The Davos Disputation and Twentieth Century Philosophy

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Although considerable progress has recently been made, the pervasive split or gulf between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophical traditions is still an important problem inherited from the history of twentieth century philosophy. I address this problem, in Friedman (2000), by focussing on an encounter between Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger in 1929 at the Davos University Course, where Carnap attended a famous disputation between Heidegger and Cassirer in which Heidegger articulated a thoroughgoing attack on the neo-Kantian tradition with which Cassirer was then most closely associated.[1] It was shortly after this occasion, in particular, that Carnap embarked on a rather serious study of Heidegger's philosophy, resulting in his well-known polemical attack on Heidegger published as Carnap (1932). Starting from the issues about neo-Kantianism and the proper interpretation of Kant raised at Davos, I then try to show that Carnap's and Heidegger's philosophical development can be illuminatingly portrayed in terms of their radically diverging paths from a common neo-Kantian heritage – where Cassirer's later development, in turn, can be viewed as a kind of heroic attempt to maintain a mediating or synthesizing position between the sharply opposed philosophical positions staked out by his two more radical colleagues. I conclude, accordingly, that those seeking to move beyond the analytic/continental divide can profitably begin by re-examining Cassirer's now unfortunately forgotten efforts at reconciliation and synthesis.

A very natural reaction to the story I have told is that it is much too one-sided and selective. Can we really understand the development of the analytic tradition by focussing on Carnap's early flirtation with neo-Kantianism? What about the original Machian positivism that profoundly influenced the Vienna Circle? What about Russell and Moore? What, in particular, about Russell's deep influence on Carnap's early epistemology, which is strongly emphasized and acknowledged by Carnap himself? Similarly, can we really understand the development of the continental tradition and the ensuing divergence between the two traditions by focussing on Heidegger's relation to neo-Kantianism? What about Heidegger's own self-professed reliance on the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition and the ancient Greeks? What about the thoroughgoing historicism he derives from Wilhelm Dilthey? What, indeed, about the very deep influence of Husserl (with whom Heidegger had earlier studied at Freiburg and whose Chair he took over following the events at Davos)? Finally, can we really derive progressive philo-

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sophical inspiration from the thought of Cassirer? Perhaps, on the contrary, it would be better if we finally moved away from Kantianism and neo-Kantianism entirely and oriented our future philosophizing along less systematic and more pluralistic lines.[2]

The first point I would like to make is that my book does not, of course, attempt to tell the whole story about the analytic/continental divide – or even the whole story about Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. It is a book, rather, about the Davos encounter, in particular, and Carnap's polemical reaction to Heidegger in the years immediately following this encounter. (Heidegger later sharply responded to Carnap's attack in his lecture course, 'Introduction to Metaphysics', in 1935.) However, I do believe that these events have particular importance for our understanding of the analytic/continental divide, and the reason, in the first instance, is simply that we here find a direct and self-conscious intellectual confrontation between Heidegger as an emerging leader of what will later become known as the continental tradition, Carnap as an emerging leader of what will later become known as the analytic tradition, and Cassirer as a leading representative of the then dominant neo-Kantian tradition against which, at least in part, both new traditions were defining themselves. Moreover, whereas in the years preceding the Davos encounter the differing philosophical tendencies from which the analytic and continental traditions emerged were able fruitfully to communicate and debate with one another within a common philosophical vocabulary, the years following this encounter saw a growing intellectual, linguistic, and geographical isolation and estrangement of the two traditions, due largely to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 and the resulting intellectual migration, leaving Heidegger virtually alone on the continent. It is in this sense that the particular events with which I am primarily concerned were pivotally implicated, in fact, with a thoroughgoing split or gulf between two intellectual traditions in virtue of which they literally lost their ability to communicate with one another (and without the ability to communicate, of course, there can be no productive intellectual disagreement).[3]

The second main point I would like to make concerns the philosophical content of the Davos disputation, which, as I have already suggested, revolved around both the fate of neo-Kantianism in the early twentieth century and the proper interpretation of Kant himself. In particular, Heidegger used the occasion to argue, in explicit opposition to the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism with which Cassirer was closely associated, that Kant's philosophical achievement was not to advance a theory of knowledge – much less a theory of specifically scientific knowledge – but was rather to contribute a new 'laying of the groundwork' for metaphysics. Heidegger's interpretation, which was then made public in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (note 1 above), focusses on Kant's famously obscure remark about a possible 'common root' for the two otherwise entirely independent faculties of understanding and sensibility, and Heidegger's suggestion, in remarkable agreement with the argument of his own just published Being and Time (1927), is that this common root is in fact to be found in what Heidegger himself calls temporality – the most fundamental ontological category in his own

'existential analytic of Dasein'. Kant, on Heidegger's telling, drew back from the radical consequences of his own discovery, which, according to Heidegger, implies that the traditional basis of Western metaphysics in logos, Geist, or reason is definitively destroyed. Nevertheless, there is nonetheless no doubt at all, for Heidegger, that this radically 'anti-rationalistic' discovery is indeed implicit in Kant's own doctrines. Heidegger's explicit aim in this particular context was thus to use Kant himself to overcome the overly 'rationalistic' philosophy he found in contemporary neo-Kantianism – and to supplant the remaining 'rationalistic' tendencies he found in Husserlian phenomenology as well.[4]

My own aim, therefore, given these issues raised at Davos, was to examine the ways in which the earlier thought of both Carnap and Heidegger (and, of course, Cassirer) emerged from a common background in early twentieth century neo-Kantianism. I note, in particular, that Carnap wrote his doctoral dissertation on the concept of space with Bruno Bauch, who had himself been trained by the leading representative of the Baden or Southwest School of neo-Kantianism, Heinrich Rickert, at Freiburg, and that Carnap, throughout his earlier philosophical career – up to and including Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) – was clearly indebted to the writings of Bauch, Rickert, Cassirer, and Paul Natorp (another leading representative of the Marburg School). I also note that Heidegger had written his habilitation under Rickert at Freiburg, and I discuss Heidegger's explicit dependence on some of Rickert's central doctrines in his earlier thought.[5] The point is not that Bauch or Cassirer are more important influences on Carnap than Frege, Wittgenstein, or Russell. In particular, there is no doubt that Russell, as Carnap himself says, was by far the most important influence on Carnap's epistemological program in the Aufbau, for it was from Russell that Carnap adopted the crucial idea of 'logic as the essence of philosophy'. There is similarly no doubt that Husserl's influence on Heidegger is much more important than that of Rickert, for it was from Husserl that Heidegger adopted the idea of phenomenology as the new 'scientific method' in philosophy. It is equally true, however, that Carnap and Heidegger used the new methodological ideals they had absorbed from Russell and Husserl, respectively, to carry forward philosophical themes and resolve philosophical problems that were inherited from the neo-Kantian intellectual traditions within which they had been trained, and, in this respect, they applied these new methodological ideals to philosophical themes and problems that were quite foreign to the thought of Russell and Husserl themselves.

The philosophical themes in question concerned the fundamental Kantian problem of the relationship between the passive or receptive faculty of sensibility and the active or intellectual faculty of understanding – the very problem that later dominated the debate between Heidegger and Cassirer at Davos.[6] For Kant, as I have already suggested, these two faculties are initially entirely independent of one another. The intellectual faculty of understanding is given its particular structure by the traditional forms of judgement supplied by Aristotelian formal logic, whereas the peculiar structure of sensibility is inherited from pure mathematics (as distinct from formal logic) taken, in turn, as a reflection of the a priori character of the 'pure intuitions' of space and time. The fundamental problem, for

Kant, is then to show how these two independent faculties nevertheless have a necessary relation to one another, and this crucial mediating function is effected by what Kant calls the 'transcendental schematism of the imagination', whereby the pure concepts or categories of the understanding (as initially derived from the traditional logical forms of judgement) are 'schematized' in terms of the pure forms of intuition. Categorical judgements, for example, give rise to the schematized category of substance by being connected with the temporal representation of permanence; hypothetical judgements give rise to the schematized category of causality by being connected with the temporal representation of succession; and so on. The point, more generally, is that what Kant calls transcendental logic, the theory of the categories underlying all human knowledge and experience, necessarily goes beyond what he calls formal or general logic, in that the latter must be related to the independent spatio-temporal structure of sensibility in order to give rise to the former.[7]

Yet both early twentieth century schools of neo-Kantianism entirely reject the idea of an independent faculty of pure intuition or sensibility. For these thinkers, accordingly, the a priori formal structures in virtue of which the object of human knowledge and experience first becomes possible must derive from the logical faculty of understanding and from this faculty alone. Space and time no longer function as independent forms of pure sensibility, and so the 'constitution' of experience described by transcendental logic must now proceed on the basis of purely conceptual, purely logical formal structures: formal logic must somehow take over the mediating role between a priori reason and a posteriori sensible experience all by itself. The leading idea of the Marburg School (especially as developed by Cassirer) is to take nineteenth century developments in the exact sciences of mathematics and mathematical physics, and not the traditional Aristotelian theory of the logical forms of judgement, as our most important 'clue' to the fundamental structure of the intellect. More specifically, the modern concepts of function, relation, and series provide us with entirely new insight into our basic forms of conceptualization, and we can then use this insight to construct a similarly new picture of the way in which the mind establishes a necessary relation to sense experience: namely, the so-called 'genetic' conception of knowledge, wherein empirical knowledge, in particular, is seen as a never completed series of formal abstract structures somehow 'converging' on the individual concrete object of experience as an ideal limit.

The Southwest School, by contrast, decisively rejects this Marburg 'mathematization' of formal logic. Formal logic remains Aristotelian syllogistic, so that mathematical thought, in particular, must be sharply distinguished from properly logical thought – and this, in fact, is one of the most important of Rickert's ideas which Heidegger explicitly defends in his habilitation. Moreover, and as a consequence, the 'genetic' conception of knowledge is also decisively rejected: the actual concrete object of experience can in no way be viewed as a formally constructed ideal limit but must rather be conceived as a genuinely independent entity – given, as it was for Kant, via an entirely independent 'manifold of sensations' – standing over and against the original forms of thought expressing the

most fundamental logical structure of the intellect. Yet, since Kant's idea of an independent a priori faculty of pure intuition (to which the logical forms of thought are related by the transcendental schematism of the imagination) is also rejected, we are left with overwhelming problems in constructing any kind of mediating connection between formal logic, on the one side, and concrete sensory experience, on the other. We are left with overwhelming problems, that is, in effecting a Kantian theory of the categories. These problems become particularly clear and explicit in the work of Emil Lask, another student of Rickert's at Freiburg, with the result that formal logic as such is entirely divorced from the theory of the categories – and one then finds Heidegger, in Being and Time, explicitly relying on this work of Lask's in developing his own 'direct realist' (and expressly anti-neo-Kantian) conception of the mind's relation to the objects of experience.[8]

By contrast, Carnap's radical reconceptualization of epistemology in the Aufbau can be seen, at least in part, as a further development of the more mathematical 'logicization' of experience effected by the Marburg School – and Carnap himself is completely explicit about this. In particular, taking formal logic to be given by the new mathematical logic of Principia Mathematica, one can now show by actual logical construction how the initially entirely private and subjective 'manifold of sensations' (Carnap's set of 'elementary experiences') is successively 'objectified' by application of the a priori formal structures of logic in a serial or step-wise 'constitution of reality.' The real individual object of experience is not conceived as an infinitely distant ideal limit, however, for, as Carnap clearly emphasizes, all objects of knowledge are defined or 'constituted' at definite finite ranks in the hierarchy of Russellian logical types. As a result, as Carnap also emphasizes explicitly, there is no longer any need of the synthetic (as opposed to the purely logical or analytic) a priori, and so transcendental logic, in the original Kantian sense, has now been finally fully absorbed into formal logic.[9] This is the ultimate epistemological significance of the idea of 'logic as the essence of philosophy' here, and it is precisely this fundamental divergence over the foundational role of logic within empirical knowledge, I believe, that forms the true philosophical background for Carnap's later polemical exchange with Heidegger following the encounter at Davos.

Cassirer, for his part, had already moved beyond the original doctrines of the Marburg School in the years immediately preceding the encounter at Davos. Whereas the original Marburg conception portrayed the concrete object of empirical knowledge – that is, empirical natural scientific knowledge – as an infinitely distant ideal limit, Cassirer, in his three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, published in the 1920s, portrays scientific knowledge itself as resting on a more primitive, more original basis in both ordinary language and perception and, even more fundamentally, in what Cassirer calls mythical thought.[10] Here Cassirer is explicitly responding to the challenges to scientific 'rationalism' posed by recent work within the tradition of *Lebensphilosophie* by such thinkers as Dilthey, Max Scheler, Cassirer's own teacher Georg Simmel, and Heidegger. Cassirer's idea, more specifically, is that scientific knowledge in general is just

one possible 'symbolic form' among many, which, in particular, is only fully comprehensible in its own right when seen as the product of a dialectical evolution from more primitive but nonetheless entirely independent and autonomous symbolic forms: precisely the forms embodied first in mythical thought and then in more ordinary types of language and perceptual consciousness. At the same time, however, scientific knowledge as such – which, for Cassirer, reaches its very highest form of symbolic expression in modern mathematical logic – remains, in an important sense, the most fully self-conscious and developed symbolic form of all, and it is in this way, in the end, that Cassirer hopes to mediate between the more exclusively scientific and 'rationalistic' preoccupations of both logical empiricism and the Marburg School (including his own earlier work) and the tendency to look for deeper and more original layers of thought and experience expressed in contemporary *Lebensphilosophie*.[11]

Such, in outline, is the story I have tried to tell. But the more interesting question, of course, concerns the wider philosophical and historical import of this story. What do we really learn about the nature of twentieth century philosophy and its history if I am correct? Do the debates arising within early twentieth century neo-Kantianism on which I have focussed really hold the key to the development of twentieth century philosophy more generally? And should we, accordingly, now try to resurrect some kind of neo-Kantian position in order to make progress beyond this point?[12]

I do not pretend, as I have already said, to have given anything like a full and comprehensive account of the twentieth century split between analytic and continental traditions. But I do claim, nonetheless, that the particular interactions and events on which I have focussed are especially illuminating in this regard. And one important reason for this, as I have also already suggested, is that these events involved a rare direct confrontation between two of the emerging leaders of the analytic and continental traditions, in relation to the then most important representative of the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition they explicitly aimed to replace. Moreover, the events in question occurred at a critical historical juncture, immediately following which, in particular, the split between analytic and continental traditions became much more than a mere difference or disagreement in philosophical orientation and approach but rather an actual linguistic, geographical, and cultural separation or isolation in which the very ability to communicate was fundamentally threatened if not destroyed. Finally, the underlying philosophical issues, as we have seen, go to the heart and basis of the Kantian system – which system, for better or for worse, has in fact dominated modern philosophy throughout the post-Kantian period. An understanding of how both twentieth century traditions – analytic as well as continental – emerge out of a common set of characteristically Kantian themes and problem can therefore, in my opinion, provide a particularly fruitful starting point for moving beyond the communicative impasse afflicting later twentieth century thought.[13]

The most pressing question, however, concerns how we may now best proceed against this background. And here, of course, there is no single and uniquely correct answer. I do not think, in particular, that we should all become neo-

Kantians, and I do not believe, more specifically, that we can simply become disciples of Cassirer's. Indeed, I explicitly argue that Cassirer's own attempt to extend a basically Kantian perspective to embrace both scientific and non-scientific modes of thought within a comprehensive philosophy of symbolic forms does not in fact succeed. Moreover, from our present point of view, Cassirer's concern with reconciling the scientific preoccupations of both Marburg neo-Kantianism and logical empiricism with the complementary preoccupations of contemporary Lebensphilosophie now appears decidedly dated, in that we ourselves are far more concerned with the opposition between 'transcendental' and more naturalistic approaches to philosophy, for example, than we are with the perhaps not so unfortunately forgotten issues raised by early twentieth century Lebensphilosophie.

Nevertheless, there is at least one aspect of Cassirer's philosophical approach that I think is most relevant indeed to our contemporary philosophical predicament: namely, his interest in forging a connection between scientific and more broadly 'humanistic' orientations in philosophy (embracing both the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften) and, more importantly, the characteristic method he adopts for pursuing this end. For the essence of Cassirer's approach is to employ the most sophisticated and comprehensive resources of conceptual intellectual history (and thus the resources of a paradigmatic Geisteswissenschaft) in attempting to craft a new philosophical orientation appropriate to the problems and predicaments of the present. For Cassirer this meant, in particular, that we attempt to trace the conceptual evolution of both modern science and modern philosophy – and the conceptual interactions between them – within the framework of an historicized (and to this extent Hegelian) version of a broadly Kantian theory of the most general forms and categories of human thought, and this approach was later generalized and extended, in the philosophy of symbolic forms, to embrace what we might call the conceptual history of all of human culture as a whole.[14] Now this last step, as I have said, is one that I myself am not prepared to take. But Cassirer's earlier approach, exemplified in his more narrowly scientific works, makes particularly good sense, I believe, within our present, post-logical-empiricist and post-Kuhnian situation in philosophy of science and scientific epistemology.[15]

I believe that conceptual intellectual history, more generally, offers an especially promising avenue (again, one among others) for overcoming the split between analytic and continental traditions. Such history has been a mainstay, since Hegel, of what we now call the continental philosophical tradition, in that internal engagement with the main figures from the history of Western philosophy has typically been seen as essential, within this tradition, to the practice of philosophy as a discipline. This is particularly true of Heidegger himself, of course, who characteristically attempted critically to reinterpret and thus directly to engage with the history of Western philosophy in the very effort finally to overcome it (compare note 4 above). In the revolutionary heydays of the analytic tradition, by contrast, the idea was to begin again (as it were, from scratch) with a radically new method of philosophizing – based, at least initially, on modern

mathematical logic – which was to leave the history of the subject entirely behind, and this much, in particular, is common to all the great leaders of the analytic tradition in the twentieth century, from Russell and Wittgenstein to Carnap and Quine.[16] In more recent years, however, there have been very clear signs that both the history of philosophy as a scholarly enterprise and attempts to engage philosophically with the main figures of the Western tradition have become increasingly viewed as respectable – if not central – within analytic philosophy as a whole.[17] Continuing efforts in this direction therefore strike me as particularly well suited for reestablishing fruitful intellectual communication with our erstwhile continental colleagues.[18] Friedman (2000) attempts to apply this approach to one significant defining episode from the history of the analytic/continental divide itself.[19]

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NOTES

[1] Heidegger then wrote up his own militantly anti-neo-Kantian reading of Kant immediately following the encounter at Davos and published it as Heidegger (1929). The English translation Heidegger (1990) also contains a translation of a protocol of the Davos disputation.

[2] All of these points are raised in a knowledgeable and perceptive review of my book by Hans Sluga (2001). Since I have encountered essentially the same concerns on several other occasions, and since the underlying issues are of broad general importance, I would like to take this opportunity to offer a careful reconsideration and response.

[3] Sluga's main thrust is that I am primarily driven by a philosophical agenda according to which the concerns of both analytic and continental philosophy are to be subsumed within a common neo-Kantian framework of the kind pursued by Cassirer, and he questions, accordingly, whether any such reconciliation – aimed, as he sees it, at the elimination of all conflict and disagreement between the two traditions – is desirable (Sluga 2001: 609–11). For Sluga, I then focus on the disputation at Davos only '[i]n order to substantiate [my] picture of Cassirer as a potential mediator between the analytic and continental traditions' (607). This puts the matter backwards, however. I begin with the disputation at Davos for the reasons just indicated, and I focus on issues involving neo-Kantianism precisely because these were the issues raised at Davos. Moreover, as explained below, I do not at all intend to impose an overarching neo-Kantian framework (much less the particular framework offered by Cassirer) as a way of reconciling the analytic and continental traditions. Finally, I should emphasize that, although I do claim that the events and issues on which I focus are of particular importance, I do not claim that they are necessarily more important and illuminating than a number of other possible approches to the

analytic/continental divide one might choose to investigate (such as differences and disputes between Husserl and Frege, for example).

[4] Heidegger has of course been extraordinarily successful here. Not only has his attack on Western 'rationalism' been the most dominant influence by far on what we now call the continental philosophical tradition, but his work has also been extremely influential within twentieth century Kant scholarship as well – again, especially on the continent Moreover, although Heidegger later explicitly renounced his interpretation as doing too much 'violence' to Kant's texts, it remains a very serious and thoughtful reading based on a deep and insightful engagement with these texts. Indeed, Heidegger was so concerned with Kant, throughout his philosophical career, that he published two books on the topic – the second (Heidegger 1962) is based on a lecture course originally given in 1935–6. Moreover, he also offered a very important and influential lecture course on 'Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' in 1927–8 (Heidegger 1977).

[5] Sluga 2001: 604 correctly points out that, although Rickert was the official evaluator of Heidegger's habilitation, Rickert left the detailed reading and assessment to Engelbert Krebs, with whom Heidegger had actually worked more closely. Nevertheless, as I point out below (and discuss in note 8) there is no doubt that themes and problems originating in Rickert's neo-Kantianism left an indelible impression on Heidegger's work.

[6] It is unfortunate that Sluga entirely ignores these themes – thereby, from my point of view, missing both the continuing importance of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophical problems in Carnap's and Heidegger's early intellectual development and the very clear connection between these problems and the debate at Davos. For Sluga, the case for the importance of neo-Kantianism in the philosophical development of Carnap and Heidegger hinges primarily on the relative importance of Bauch and Rickert, respectively, as direct philosophical influences, and the observation that Russell and Husserl are far more important therefore suffices, by itself, to raise serious questions about this case (Sluga 2001: 602–4). It is for this reason that I here find it necessary to readdress the fundamental Kantian problematic of sensibility and understanding – and the way in which, in particular, it is worked out in the two opposing schools of neo-Kantianism – at some length.

[7] This kind of reading of Kant, at least in its broad outlines, is not particularly controversial today. For my own perspective, which is very definitely influenced by the Marburg School in its emphasis on Kant's relationship to contemporary mathematical science, see Friedman (1992). I do not at all agree with the specifics of the Marburg reading, however, according to which even Kant himself had eventually overcome the radical distinction between sensibility and understanding (see below). On the contrary, I believe that there is no way to do justice to Kant's own views without placing this distinction at the very center of his thought.

[8] See the crucial section 44 of Heidegger (1927) on 'Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth'. Here Heidegger refers both to the work of Lask and to Husserl's conception of truth as direct 'identification' in the second volume of his Logical Investigations. It is unfortunate, once again, that Sluga ignores the influence of Lask here – and therefore the resulting continuity between Rickert-inspired themes in Heidegger's habilitation and Heidegger (1927: section 44). Instead, Sluga (2001: 604) simply points out (correctly) that Heidegger had already achieved considerable distance from Rickert in his habilitation, and (also correctly) that in Being and Time 'what dominates are phenomenological, existential, and historicist strains of thought'. Yes, but these new philosophical tools are here being applied (in section 44) to a philosophical problem having its origins in Rickert's neo-Kantianism – and, of course, that Heidegger ends up disagreeing with Rickert here is in no way incompatible with the fact that he does derive this problem ultimately from Rickert.

[9] See section 179 of Carnap (1928), where Carnap simultaneously rejects both the synthetic a priori and Natorp's particular version of the Marburg 'genetic' conception of knowledge. Here the problems in Sluga's approach I identified in notes 6 and 8 above repeat themselves. In particular, it is only because he fails to consider the way in which Carnap explicitly addresses a problem originating within Marburg neo-Kantianism by means of the new logical tools developed by Russell that Sluga can take Carnap's own emphatic declaration that the Aufbau was inspired by Russell (that is, by the idea of 'logic as the essence of philosophy') as creating a formidable difficulty for my interpretation (Sluga 2001: 602–3). Yes, Russell's Principia Mathematica, on the one hand, and his recommendation that the new mathematical logic provides all the essential tools for epistemology, on the other, are the decisive influences on Carnap's Aufbau, but, once again, these tools are here being applied (in section 179) to an explicitly neo-Kantian problematic (derived from the Marburg School) with which Russell himself was never seriously concerned.

[10] See Cassirer (1923), Cassirer (1925), Cassirer (1929).

[11] In connection with Heidegger, in particular, Cassirer added five footnotes to the final version of Cassirer (1929), suggestively entitled The Phenomenology of Knowledge, explicitly considering the argument of Being and Time. Heidegger had already referred to Cassirer (1925) in Being and Time itself and later published a critical review of this volume in 1928. Cassirer, in turn, published a review of Heidegger (1929) in 1931 (explicitly alluding to the disputation at Davos). Cassirer is not so explicit about his position vis-à-vis logical empiricism in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, but he does make this clear in other work from the same time (with respect to Moritz Schlick) and later (with respect to Carnap). It is also worth noting, finally, that Carnap, too, was significantly influenced by Lebensphilosophie. Indeed, the final section of Carnap 1932, entitled 'Metaphysics as the expression of Lebensgefühl', favorably refers to the work of both Dilthey and Nietzsche and concludes that art is the adequate expression of the same fundamental Lebensgefühl for which metaphysics is an inadequate expression.

[12] As I indicated in note 3 above, Sluga believes that the main driving force behind my historical narrative is a philosophical agenda recommending that we now re-embrace a synthetic neo-Kantian position of the kind championed by Cassirer in order finally to reconcile the analytic and continental traditions, and his review ends, accordingly, with a ringing call to arms against any such idea. As Sluga 2001: 611 puts it, 'nothing is more disconcerting to those committed to other ideals within the analytic tradition (be they naturalistic, empiricist, positivist, scientistic, pragmatist, skeptical or Wittgensteinian) than the apparently unstoppable encroachment of Kantian modes of thinking'.

[13] Here it is important to see that the split between analytic and continental traditions has resulted in a genuine communicative impasse – not simply in the kind of conflict and disagreement which, as Sluga 2001: 610 rightly emphasizes, is typically a 'productive force.' I myself find nothing very productive about the mutual isolation and alienation that has divided twentieth century analytic and continental philosophy, and what I am recommending, therefore, is that a better understanding of their common historical origins (which, not surprisingly, indeed go back to Kant) can provide one important route (among others) towards the redefinition and re-articulation of common terms of discussion and debate.

[14] Cassirer (1929) makes it very that what he calls the phenomenology of knowledge (see note 11 above) is intended in the Hegelian (rather than Husserlian) sense.

[15] For my own (preliminary) attempt in this direction see Friedman (2001).

[16] That the radically new method of philosophisizing should be centrally based on modern mathematical logic is of course precisely what is rejected in Wittgenstein's later

thought. More generally, Wittgenstein himself never (neither early nor late) accepted the idea of a 'scientific' philosophy embraced by the other great leaders of the analytic tradition. (Here I am especially indebted to comments from the referee for the European Journal of Philosophy.)

[17] Thus I here have in mind not only the relatively recent revival of serious scholarly work in the history of modern philosophy (including Kant), but also the recent attempts, within mainstream moral philosophy, political philosophy, and epistemology and metaphysics, for example, to reappropriate the insights of the modern philosophical tradition. A particularly interesting and influential work, in this last connection, is McDowell 1994, which explores some main problems in epistemology and the philosophy of mind by reexamining precisely the fundamental Kantian distinction between understanding and sensibility. For my own attempt to come to terms with this work see Friedman 1996.

[18] Here, I believe, Sluga and I are largely in agreement. I become somewhat puzzled, however, when he recommends a Wittgensteinian alternative to my historical approach (Sluga 2001: 610, and compare 604–5). I am not sure, to begin with, what a Wittgensteinian approach to intellectual history would look like, given that Wittgenstein himself practiced a resolutely ahistorical method of philosophizing. Sluga himself appears to favor a more empirical, external, and less conceptual approach to intellectual history, concerned primarily with the formation and organization of schools and circles, for example, and with tracing out direct lines of influence rather than the 'inner logic' of problems and ideas (see notes 6, 8, and 9 above). I doubt, however, that this style of history has any particular relation to Wittgenstein's philosophical intentions, given that Wittgenstein's method is self-consciously 'grammatical' as opposed to empirical and operates, accordingly, principally with purely imaginary examples of 'language games' rather than actual empirical instances of real human behavior. In this sense, the recommendation of a more empirical and external approach to intellectual history represents the same kind of misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical intentions as parallel attempts to appropriate them on behalf of an empirical ethnology or sociology of knowledge. For my own criticism of some of these latter attempts see Friedman (1998).

[19] I am indebted to comments from Rolf-Peter Horstmann, the referee for the European Journal of Philosophy, and Graciela De Pierris.

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